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The Darwinian Left 
A Rhetoric of Realism or Reaction?1 
Steve Fuller 
Poroi, 1, 1, January, 2001 
          
 
1 
 
Before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, socialists could claim 
they had done a better job of uniting theory and practice than 
capitalists.   Socialists had generally succeeded in raising the 
welfare of the bottom end of their societies, typically at the cost of 
lowering it at the top end.  And that is exactly as the socialists 
would have wanted it.  For, even if not all socialists held the rich 
personally responsible for the plight of the poor, all were in 
agreement that the rich constituted a structural obstacle in the 
struggle to overcome mass poverty.  In contrast, capitalists have 
found it more difficult to square their own theory and practice.  In 
theory, everyone should flourish with the liberalization of 
markets.  Yet, in practice, even when the poor increased their 
income, it was never enough to catch up with the increases in 
wealth made by the rich.  The result was an intensification of 
existing class divisions, or “relative deprivation,” which capitalist 
theorists could only attempt to explain away by invoking such ad 
hoc factors as the lack of a work ethic among the poor or the 
unpredictability of markets.  
 
 
2 
 
Back then capitalists found themselves on the defensive precisely 
because they agreed with the socialists on the fundamental 
equality of all human beings.  Nothing in capitalism implies 
contempt for the poor in the way socialism implies contempt for 
the rich.  Both capitalists and socialists concurred that given the 
right political economy, everyone should be able to function as 
full-fledged members of society.  Thus the increasing political and 
economic disparities in advanced capitalist societies – especially 
the United States – suggested that their grounding theory was 
fatally wrong.  I certainly remember my parents and teachers 
claiming as late as my senior year in college (1979) that Marx was 
correct at least in his general claim that once capitalist societies 
turned socialist, they would never look back.  The welfare state was 
then seen as facilitating socialist reforms in countries with 
atavistically strong capitalist traditions, not (as today) providing a 
temporary safeguard in nations that have yet to master the laws of 
the market.  As it turned out, a mere quarter-century’s worth of 
political experience (roughly 1945-70) was pumped up into proof 
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that Marx had discovered the basic law of social progress.  Not 
surprisingly, then, it took even less time to demonstrate, with 
equal conclusiveness, that Marx had been wrong all along.  
 
3 
 
Enter Peter Singer, the latest philosopher to try to convert the 
recent past into political destiny via the alchemy of a scientifically 
inspired metaphysics (Singer, 1999a).  Singer’s philosopher's stone 
turns out to be Darwinism, which he believes can revive the 
fortunes of the Left in today’s post-Marxist world.  Quoting 
Richard Dawkins, Singer portrays Darwin, not Marx, as Hegel’s 
true heir: 
 
 
 
 
Although “'We are built as gene machines,” [Dawkins] 
tells us, “we have the power to turn against our 
creators.”  There is an important truth here.  We are 
the first generation to understand not only that we 
have evolved, but also the mechanisms by which we 
have evolved and how this evolutionary heritage 
influences our behavior.  In his philosophical epic, The 
Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel portrayed the 
culmination of history as a state of Absolute 
Knowledge, in which Mind knows itself for what it is, 
and hence achieves its own freedom.  We don’t have to 
buy Hegel’s metaphysics to see something similar 
really has happened in the last fifty years.  For the first 
time since life emerged from the primeval soup, there 
are beings who understand how they have come be 
what they are (Singer 1999a, p. 63).  
 
 
 
 
An important assumption that Singer makes – which I happen to 
share – is that the Left requires a ‘scientific’ foundation, at least 
insofar as progressive politics needs to legitimize any substantial 
deviation from past policies.  After all, the people who would have 
to endure any proposed policy changes are precisely the ones who 
have endured the policies that would now be changed.  In the 
modern world, science seems to provide the only consistently 
persuasive basis for believing that systematic change will be better 
than stasis.  Nevertheless Singer’s vision of a “Darwinian Left” 
does little to exploit science's role as an alternative source of 
authority to tradition.  If anything, his use of Darwin reinforces 
traditional views and limits the scope for social change.  Simply 
consider the ease with which Singer quotes Dawkins (in the 
sentence before the one quoted above) who asserts that altruism 
“has no place in nature, [is] something that has never existed in 
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the whole history of the world.” 
 
4 
 
This essay is an exercise in social epistemology, one of the most 
effective critical strategies available to the rhetoric of science.  In 
the first instance, I read Singer's turn from Marx to Darwin as a 
sign of our times.  However, the sharp chord that Singer strikes in 
other contemporary leftists obscures as much as it reveals.  In 
particular, it hides the conservative roots of Darwinism that, in its 
first 150 years, has made it such an unreliable fellow-traveler of 
those concerned with the liberation of traditionally 
disenfranchised groups in society.  These roots are worth 
revisiting, since they are not exactly as they might first appear, nor 
their effects exactly as devotees of neat ideological distinctions 
might wish.  Yet, even after the scientific and political rhetorics 
surrounding the “selfish gene” hypothesis are disentangled, it is 
clear that a significant part of the human – and even animal – 
condition is underplayed by Singer's appropriation of Darwinism.  
This missing aspect is epitomized by Hegel's phrase, “the quest for 
recognition,” the most eloquent recent expression of which has 
been by Francis Fukuyama (1992).  Without completely endorsing 
Fukuyama’s rather sanguine democratic liberalism, I argue that he 
has tapped into a deep current in Western thought that remains 
unrepresented in modern biological science.  To be sure, here is 
not the place to propose a heroic synthesis of the Darwinian and 
Hegelian strands in evolution.  Nevertheless I discuss how greater 
attention to the Hegelian strand would overturn an intuition 
Singer shares with many interpreters of the human condition, 
namely, that greater familiarity should breed charity - rather than 
contempt – of those interpreted.  
 
 
 
 
Hume’s Hidden Right Hand and 
the Origins of the Darwinian Left  
 
5 
 
Singer blames Marxism for failing to realize that humans are 
biologically constituted to resist the sort of comprehensive societal 
transformation promised by a Marxist revolutionary order.  But he 
does not mean to endorse libertarianism here.  The problem is not 
that Marxism constrained people’s “natural liberty.”  Singer holds 
that Marxism did not take seriously the evolutionary adaptiveness 
of persistent social arrangements, especially ones that contradict 
the revolutionary’s most cherished ideal, egalitarianism.  In 
developing this argument, it soon becomes clear that Singer is 
targeting a particular form of socially engineered equality – 
namely, between the sexes.  Here Darwinism’s causal focus on 
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sexual reproduction as the key to species survival in humans is 
alleged to contain some valuable political lessons for the Left:  
“While Darwinian thought has no impact on the priority we give to 
equality as a moral or political ideal, it gives us grounds for 
believing that since men and women play different roles in 
reproduction, they may also differ in their inclinations and 
temperaments, in ways that best promote the reproductive 
prospects of each sex” (Singer 1999a, pp. 17-18). 
 
6 
 
To those familiar with Singer’s long-standing interest in extending 
rights to animals, which is also based on Darwin-inspired 
reasoning, the apparent ease with which he can excuse gender 
discrimination may seem odd.  However, it is characteristic of the 
English philosophical tradition, on which both Darwin and Singer 
draw, to argue on “naturalistic” grounds both for breaking down 
any hard ontological distinction between humans and other animal 
species and reinforcing persistent social distinctions within 
humans.  What has varied across thinkers and centuries in this 
tradition is exactly how one proceeds to bridge the gap between 
humans and non-humans and which persistent human social 
distinctions are legitimized.  
 
 
7 
 
Armed with the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, Singer can point to the 
vast majority of overlapping genes between animal species to 
warrant the extension of rights to animals.  Sigmund Freud, a pre-
Mendelian Darwinian who appreciated the English tradition, could 
treat human beings as distinctive physiological channels for 
generalized animal energies, while recoiling from John Stuart 
Mill's call for gender equality – even as he was translating The 
Subjection of Women into German! (Appignanesi and Forrester 
2000, pp. 421-423).  Darwin himself, by no means an activist for 
the rights of either women or animals, originally learned to blur 
the human-animal distinction from David Hume’s account of 
reason as an instinct common to all animals but expressed in 
varying degrees in different species and even different races, given 
Hume’s views on the multiple origins of humans from apes 
(Richards 1987, pp. 106-109; Harris 1968, pp. 87-88).  Since Hume 
both exemplifies the mentality that informs Singer’s discussion 
and continues to enjoy totemic status in contemporary anglophone 
philosophy, a brief digression may be in order.  
 
 
8 
 
Historians of modern philosophy have observed, usually in 
perplexity, why Hume, now seen as the most reasonable and well 
reasoned of the British empiricists (Mill included), was consigned 
to minority status for the 100 years following his death – that is, 
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until the rise of Darwinism in British intellectual culture.  While 
Hume’s staunch anti-clericalism is usually cited as the reason, that 
is only part of the story:  he was an anti-clerical Scot who upheld 
the English monarchy because of its proven ability to keep the 
nation united in peace and prosperity.  Before the widespread 
acceptance of naturalistic arguments for the maintenance of 
tradition – often under the rubrics of “adaptationism” and 
“functionalism” – there was no obvious ideological niche for a 
secular Tory thinker like Hume.  Secularists tended to be 
republicans, monarchists theists.  
 
9 
 
This point is often lost because of Hume’s much vaunted 
“scepticism” and his association with such Enlightenment icons as 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  However, Hume was sceptical only about 
a priori, not a posteriori, means of grounding authority.  The 
intended targets included not only the divine right of kings and 
innatist forms of rationalism, but also attempts to overturn 
authority by appeals to “the rights of man” and the sort of a priori 
normative principles that would motivate the French Revolution.  
Hume liked Rousseau for his views about the oppressive effects of 
corrupt institutions, not his more utopian urges to return 
humanity to some pristine, pre-institutionalized state.  Even more 
to Hume’s liking was Montesquieu's refashioning of Aristotle’s 
“Man is born into society and there he remains.”  
 
 
10 
 
In short, Hume was “radical” in much the same sense Wittgenstein 
was, namely, someone who wanted to revise how we justify 
common practices without necessarily revising the practices 
themselves.  While this strategy does little to change what happens 
on an everyday basis, it significantly alters what counts as 
legitimate grounds for change – diminishing both the presumption 
of the incumbent and the motivation of the pretender:  neither lex 
tyranni nor vox populi is treated as absolute and universal.  The 
plausibility of such a modulated view of things assumes that the 
greatest evil is to violate the “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” principle.  
It implies that one should oppose those who would exchange a 
stable social order for an untested ideal, while resisting the urge to 
redress persistent local injustices that can be ultimately explained 
as part of a global adaptive strategy.  For the generation after 
Hume, and posterity more generally, this view would receive its 
most eloquent expression by that Whig, Edmund Burke.2 
 
 
11 
 
Historically this view has suited a landed gentry suspicious of 
tyrants who advanced their fortunes by speaking for society’s lower 
orders in ways the poor themselves had not previously spoken.   
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Perhaps the most robust descendants of this line of thought in the 
20th century, the anglophile “Austrian” school of economists 
championed by Friedrich von Hayek, earned their liberal 
credentials with an early and vigorous opposition to all forms of 
totalitarianism, but then remained conspicuously silent on the 
long-standing forms of class, race, and gender discrimination that 
affirmative action legislation has been designed to counteract.  It is 
just this combination of a high sensitivity to power emanating 
from a concentrated source (e. g., a tyrant, the Politburo) and a low 
sensitivity to its emanation from a diffuse source (e. g., locally 
enforced class-, race-, gender-based prejudice) that marks Singer’s 
Darwinian Left as heir to this ultimately conservative tradition.  
 
12 
 
For these heirs of Hume, diffuse forms of power are recognized as 
natural, not coercive, especially when there are beneficiaries who 
deem their situation a “stable environment.”  Consequently they 
have difficulty seeing how a countervailing form of concentrated 
power would improve matters.  In times of domestic tranquility 
and no foreign threats, a policy of benign neglect would seem to be 
licensed.  The result is the following attitude toward women: 
 
 
 
 
In many nations, the female sex are reduced to like 
slavery, and rendered incapable of all property, in 
opposition to their lordly masters.  But though the 
males, when united, have in all countries bodily force 
sufficient to maintain this severe tyranny, yet such are 
the insinuation, address, and charms of their fair 
companions, that women are commonly able to break 
the confederacy, and share with the other sex in all the 
rights and privileges of society (Hume 1751, sec. III, 
part 1). 
 
 
 
 
Here Hume defends the de facto oppression of women by men on 
the grounds that women manage to find ways of mitigating their 
disadvantage to lead fulfilling lives and influence society.  In the 
sentences prior to these, Hume had denied the natural equality of 
all humans on the evidence of their vastly different levels of 
civility, while at the same time regretting that European colonists 
have slaughtered native Americans and impressed Blacks into 
slavery.  Hume’s concern here was with the actual misery caused, 
not any transcendental concerns about the violation of human 
dignity.  Hume’s policy message seemed to be that lesser peoples 
should be either subject to paternalistic governance or left alone in 
their sub-civilized state.  The proven “success” of male-female 
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relations testified to the former strategy, whereas the pre-colonial 
existence of Blacks and native Americans testified to the latter.  
 
13 
 
Because ideological allegiances have shifted so much over the past 
two centuries, it is easy to forget that Hume’s “balanced” counsel 
was seen in his own day as strategic complacency.  The reformists 
back then were Scottish clerics like James Beattie, who argued for 
universalism on the basis of the species essentialism that the Bible 
granted to humans, allied to the then-popular idea of an innate 
“commonsense” faculty through which God communicated with 
us.  In terms of cosmology, Beattie et al. were unable to see how 
Hume could so vigorously oppose the idea of divine creation on a 
priori grounds, while remaining confident in the “uniformity of 
nature” on a posteriori grounds.  For Beattie, as for Darwin’s 
theistic opponents, laws of nature were ipso facto evidence for 
God’s existence.  Yet, for his part, Hume’s opposition to divine 
creation mainly concerned the idea that God could intervene in the 
physical world as he pleased (i. e., breaking the laws of nature 
through miracles), which is analogous to how a tyrant would 
impose his will on the social world.  Although Hume was not as 
explicit as, say, Voltaire on this point, his view was compatible with 
God as deus absconditus: someone powerful enough to create the 
best possible world and hence capable of remaining indifferent to 
its subsequent development.  This attitude is comparable to the 
political conditions under which constitutional monarchies have 
been maintained.  
 
 
14 
 
Nevertheless the view from the Scottish clergy was that Hume’s 
defense of the English monarchy was designed to arrest any 
further extension of rights beyond what already had benefitted the 
anglophile property-owning class and its aspirants.  In that 
respect, Beattie’s appeal to universalism was not unlike today’s 
Scottish Nationalist Party’s support for the European Union as a 
countervailing force to the Crown.  To be sure, with the hindsight 
of two centuries, Beattie’s reform-minded universalism reads as 
condescending calls to uplift the “natives.”  However, I would urge 
that his sentiment be seen as anticipating affirmative action 
legislation.  Without the welfare state formally redistributing 
income from rich to poor through taxation, the only available 
strategy for equalizing human differences was to deploy the 
resources of the leading NGOs, the independent churches, which 
funded their missionary work through the devout’s subscriptions.3 
 
 
15 
 
Peter Singer wishes to return us to Hume, now armed with 
Darwin, with the slight twist that incentive schemes are used to  
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encourage the rich to transfer income to the poor by appealing to 
the likely consequences of their failure to do so, namely, that they 
might lose (through damage or theft) what they already possess – 
be it by achievement or inheritance (a distinction to which Singer 
is remarkably indifferent).  This strategy seems to be targeted to 
societies where there are zones of wealth in ambient poverty, and 
both rich and poor are sufficiently knowledgeable of the 
contribution that each makes to the other's situation:  i. e., large 
urban centers.  Such incentive schemes are unlikely to move either 
those who are secure in their wealth or despondent in their 
poverty.  In short, whatever else the “Darwinian Left” may be, it is 
an ideology with diminished political ambitions.  
 
 
 
In Quest of Recognition 
Hegel’s Heroic Hand in 
the Wake of Marxism’s Demise 
 
 
16 
 
To appreciate how Singer managed to throw out the radical 
promise of scientific politics with Marxism’s failure to redeem that 
promise, I shall start by contrasting Singer’s coroner’s report on 
the demise of Marxism with Francis Fukuyama’s (1992), which 
anticipates many of the themes to be raised here.  
 
 
17 
 
Both Singer and Fukuyama agree that, on a global level, Marxist 
socialism has been decisively defeated by liberal capitalism.  Yet 
Singer shows no regret about what might have been lost in the 
process, whereas Fukuyama keeps the normative question open – 
of course, not so much that he would have preferred a Marxist 
future to a liberal one.  He clearly agrees with Singer that Marxism 
is a bankrupt political tradition, taken on its own terms.  However, 
Fukuyama also sees Marxism as the main vehicle by which a 
certain ennobling image of humanity was projected on the world 
stage, one to which Singer is completely oblivious.  
 
 
18 
 
In contrast to Singer’s perspective, Fukuyama’s position (at least in 
its 1992 formulation) is striking in that its species-wide “struggle 
for survival” derives no intellectual sustenance from contemporary 
biological accounts of human behavior.  Rather it is steeped in 
classical Greek sources.  Fukuyama’s proximate philosophical debt 
is Hegel’s attempt to define humanity in terms of its endless quest 
for recognition, even at risk to one’s own life.  To be sure, this 
quest has undergone considerable metamorphosis in the history of 
Western culture.  It first entered Plato’s thinking as an aristocratic 
warrior ethic; and at the peak of Marxism’s popularity, it had 
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become a rallying cry for uniting the dispossessed peoples of the 
world.  
 
19 
 
But regardless of how it is manifested, the quest for recognition 
has not fitted comfortably with the selfish image of Homo Sapiens 
– and animal life more generally – common to Darwinism and its 
English roots.  Specifically it does not reflect a first-order desire for 
goods that are enjoyed privately, or “excludably,” as economists 
would put it; rather, it is a second-order “desire to be desired” that 
cannot be achieved without the participation of others.  Indeed, 
the personal goods that normally mark the achievement of 
recognition – such as titles and honours – are in themselves fairly 
trivial.  What matters is the swirl of public activity licensed by 
these symbols.  
 
 
20 
 
Ultimately the quest for recognition cannot be reduced to selfish 
behavior because those engaged in the quest are not afraid to risk 
their lives – or at least a substantial portion of their material well-
being – to do things that typically benefit others much more than 
themselves.  Not surprisingly, rational choice theory finds 
recognition-seekers prima facie irrational.  To square the quest for 
recognition with the utilitarian calculus, it is sometimes said that 
they are sacrificing themselves for the greater good of some 
favored group, but this end is more often assumed than proven.  
Moreover one can never be recognized too much, whereas the law 
of diminishing marginal utility teaches that desires can be satisfied 
so as to render any further pursuit of them pointless.  Fukuyama 
observes that the selfish human that has anchored the English 
political imagination from Hobbes to Darwin presupposes a world 
of scarce material resources, in which staying alive is the order of 
the day (1992, pp. 143-161).  This leads to an identification of 
rationality with risk-averse strategies.  Thus one always obtains 
food for oneself and for others only if the level of personal risk is 
low or the likely benefit outweighs the risk.  
 
 
21 
 
To be sure, Fukuyama’s preferred alternative – the political 
tradition that runs from Plato through Hegel – is equally aware 
that in the long run we are all dead.  Nevertheless, in that 
tradition’s state of nature, a hospitable physical environment 
makes the voluntary maintenance of life unproblematic.  Scarcity 
here is perceived as primarily a function of cognitive limitations – 
that is, the finitude of consciousness and memory, which over time 
threatens to erode any achievements in recognition.  Nevertheless 
the posous memory of ancestors and the survival of their artifacts 
show that some have managed to acquire this scarce resource, 
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which amounts to having their spirit borne by later bodies.  
Consequently rationality comes to be aligned with continuous risk-
seeking, or what Fukuyama calls the “thymic” political 
imagination, after Plato's word for courage.  Resting on one's 
laurels is not an option in a world governed by distraction and 
forgetfulness, especially where the material resources are available 
to do more than one already has.  
 
22 
 
Marx is aligned with the thymic tradition because his faith in the 
success of the proletarian revolution presupposed that capitalism's 
productivity is sufficiently high to absorb any short-term costs that 
might be incurred by the workers’ violent overthrow of the existing 
relations of production in their quest for recognition.  Thus, while 
the world of Capital is much better endowed than that of 
Leviathan, the struggle for survival features prominently in both.  
To be sure, as a diligent student of both classical philosophy and 
classical political economy, Marx integrates the struggles 
represented by Singer and Fukuyama.  The “quest for recognition” 
pursued by Marx's proletariat combined a desire for both material 
security and political status:  that is, epistemologically speaking, to 
be sheltered from the mistakes others make and to be permitted to 
make their own mistakes.  
 
 
23 
 
However, alloys of Hegel and Hobbes need not always have such 
salutary results.  A good case in point is the perpetually acquisitive 
nature of capitalism, even once the system has produced 
considerable wealth.  Marx saw this as capitalism's tragic flaw, 
which would be played out in the falling rate of profit as capitalists 
try to outdo each other by producing the most goods by the 
cheapest means.  Max Weber traced it to the inscrutability of 
divine justice behind the Protestant Ethic, while Thorstein Veblen 
and later Fred Hirsch (1976) pointed to the competitive 
consumption practices in contemporary capitalism.  It would seem 
that Hegel gets his revenge on Hobbes, since capitalists always 
crave new “states of nature” in which they can prove their 
superiority.  Fukuyama himself sees this development in more 
hopeful terms, since it spurs entrepreneurs to seek out new 
markets, which (he claims) ultimately spreads the wealth around 
the world.  Yet even Fukuyama sometimes bemoans consumerism 
as a degraded version of the quest for recognition, coming close to 
endorsing Nietzsche’s suggestion that a “good war” (even a “cold” 
one) would revive the old quest in all its heroic glory.  
 
 
24 
 
If capitalism's compulsive acquisitiveness exemplifies Hegelized 
Hobbesianism, an instance of Hobbesified Hegelianism would be  
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postmodern identity politics.  On the surface, the call to “respect” 
traditionally disadvantaged social groups appears to continue the 
quest for recognition.  However, postmodern practitioners of 
identity politics do not generally mean to risk transforming or 
losing their identity in the hope of representing the interests of 
humanity.  That would be to envisage women or minority ethnic 
groups as Marx did the proletariat, namely, as the vanguard of a 
worldwide revolutionary movement.  To be sure, liberal and 
socialist feminists have entertained just such a vision, but they are 
not typical of contemporary feminism.  Rather identity politics 
tends to pursue the narrower goal of securing social space for its 
group within an existing power structure whose defining features 
are seen as uncontrollable, if not exactly unchangeable.  
 
25 
 
An important benchmark here is the recent turn in identity politics 
toward “performativity,” as popularized by Judith Butler, but 
ultimately derived from Michel Foucault’s unfinished work on the 
history of sexuality (Butler 1990).  I would argue that the politics of 
performativity should be seen as the latest moment in the 
trajectory that includes Hume and Wittgenstein, whereby an 
epistemological radicalism belies political quiescence by 
“naturalizing” (or “empiricizing”) the scope of normatively 
appropriate action.  In Butler's championing of the ethic of “drag,” 
a renovated concept of identity provides a posteriori grounding for 
what had been previously seen as only a priori groundable.  The 
two genders remain as the normatively appropriate forms of self-
presentation, but which biologically sexed persons occupy which 
gender depend on the social consequences of one’s particular self-
presentation, a.k.a. “passing” as male or female.  Thus, in 
providing an epistemological basis for “being queer,” Butler has 
opened up social space by altering what counts as legitimate 
practice but not the practice that is thereby legitimated.  
 
 
26 
 
As with Hume and Wittgenstein, here too significant change is said 
to occur mainly as the unintended consequence of reproducing 
institutionalized practices at a local level, not some global strategy 
that lays claim to meta-level knowledge of a wide range of locales.  
As a concrete political strategy, this means that women's 
impersonations of men and vice versa are the most likely vehicles 
for redressing gender-based discrimination in a world profoundly 
structured by gender differentiation but at the same time 
providing resources for both men and women to work the system 
to their advantage.  From one standpoint, Butler’s gender 
performativity appears to be the final frontier of egalitarian 
politics.  From another, it looks like a sectarian strategy for those 
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who already enjoy considerable social, economic, and political 
freedom - such as middle class gays and bisexuals who live in the 
San Francisco Bay area.  
 
27 
 
To put the politics of performativity in perspective, recall some 
alternative strategies for redressing gender discrimination.  The 
more familiar ones have been largely state-mandated, such as 
affirmative action and equal pay legislation.  They presume that 
most women have neither the opportunity nor the inclination to 
impersonate men to improve their standard of living.  A more 
distant political possibility is the complete diffusion of gender 
identity, as organic reproduction is institutionally and 
technologically separated from sexual intercourse.  It is one thing 
to advocate free sexual passage between the two genders, but quite 
another to call for a multiplication of gender identities that ends 
up emptying the concept of gender of all meaning.  
 
 
28 
 
Gender performativists start to worry at this point, and some have 
hinted at a backlash comparable to those who celebrate the free 
passage of individuals between racial or cultural identities but then 
balk at the prospect that inter-marriage, hybridization, and sheer 
globalization might serve to render race and culture meaningless 
social categories.  Yet, even here, Hegel may have the last laugh on 
Hobbes.  As Marxists are still fond of observing, members of the 
bourgeoisie who demonized the unearned wealth of the nobility 
and clergy in the French and Russian Revolutions simply had a 
version of that argument turned against them – in the name of 
“capitalist exploitation” – by the working class, thereby removing 
any temporary advantage the bourgeoisie had gained by it.  
 
 
 
 
The Quest for Recognition as 
Transcending the Horizons of 
the Darwinian Left 
 
 
29 
 
There are many ways to think of the relationship between 
“selfishness” and “altruism” in roughly Darwinian terms.  If we 
stick to Richard Dawkins’ original formulation of the “selfish 
gene,” then everyday instances of altruism are reduced to 
epiphenomena, namely, macro-behavioral consequences of one 
organism enabling another of its kin to reproduce their common 
genes (1976).  (This is called “Hamilton’s Rule,” after Dawkins’ 
Oxford mentor, William Hamilton.)  Since a gene’s very purpose is 
self-reproduction, it needs to produce individual organisms as 
vehicles.  On this view, the organisms themselves are neither 
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selfish nor altruistic.  They are simply used by the gene for its own 
purposes.  
 
30 
 
Sometimes Dawkins is criticized for overextending the metaphor 
of selfishness.  But it would be more correct to say that the so-
called metaphor is an anthropomorphically fueled equivocation.  
On the one hand, Dawkins means that genes subject everything 
else to their own ends; on the other, he wants to suggest that 
altruism exists only as a gene-driven illusion.  However, what 
remains obscured in this equivocation is that everyday instances of 
selfishness are just as illusory as those of altruism, since any 
increase in an individual organism’s advantage is always a macro-
effect of the advantage gained by the genes that the organism 
carries.  An organism’s selfish or altruistic interests may or may 
not coincide with the conditions that enable the organism's genes 
to reproduce themselves.  In this respect, Dawkins has seriously 
misled Singer into thinking that Darwinism “proves” that 
organisms are more “naturally” selfish than altruistic.  If there is 
no other reason for attending to levels of causation in policy-
relevant arguments, this is it.  
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This deconstruction of the selfish gene metaphor enables us to 
witness the ease with which attributions of selfishness are 
transferred between the individual organism and its genetic 
constituents.  In contrast, consider the rhetorical viability of the 
“selfish society,” understood not as a society of selfish individuals 
but a society that consumes its individual members just as a gene 
consumes its organic carriers.  Here one might invoke the names 
of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, or Niklas Luhmann – all of 
whom regarded human beings as vehicles for reproducing the 
larger social system to which they belong.  Yet, interestingly, the 
selfishness metaphor is rarely extended sociologically.  On the 
contrary, the sociologists in question are normally seen as 
advancing a theory of the social system in which individuals are 
“sacrificed” or “subordinated” to a larger presence that exerts 
power over them.  It would seem, then, that Dawkins had tapped 
into an implicit convention governing metaphorical extensions of 
“selfish,” namely, that selfishness is a bottom-up-oriented relation, 
whereas power is a top-down-oriented relation.  Hence, we are 
inclined to say that society, not selfishness, exerts power over the 
individual, whereas “naturally” selfish individuals constitute 
society.  
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However, matters are complicated once genes figure in the 
equation because genes can be understood either as specific parts  
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of a whole organism or as vehicles for the expression of properties 
common to many organisms.  Most logical paradoxes rest on 
confusing part-whole and one-many relations, and gene-talk 
continues this venerable tradition with a vengeance, as epitomized 
in the question:  Will greater knowledge of genetics enable us to 
design people as we please or force us to confront the terms of our 
natural enslavement?  Singer, a follower of Dawkins, wants to 
answer yes to both questions.  Moreover it is possible to have it 
both ways, once we understand the interaction effects of different 
genes in an organism that expresses its unique genetic constitution 
under the distinct environmental regime that constitutes its 
history.  But unfortunately, our imperfect knowledge of these 
effects encourages an expedient switching between rhetorics.  
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On the one hand, a part-whole rhetoric is used to capture the 
libertarian impulse that is animated by the recent discovery of a 
“gene for X,” where “X” is a socially salient trait.  Here genetics is 
about physically localizable things in specific individuals.  On the 
other hand, the more deterministic one-many rhetoric is used for a 
widespread trait that appears intractable to policy interventions.  
Here genetics is about elusive tendencies that are unpredictably 
manifested in a general population.  Thus Singer licenses the pre-
natal manipulation or abortion of genetically disabled human 
fetuses, while (as we saw earlier) virtually excusing the long-
standing discrimination against the advancement of women in the 
workplace.  Of course, when it comes to legitimating a socially 
controversial trait like homosexuality, its antagonists will appeal to 
genetic rhetoric to nip it in the bud, whereas its supporters will the 
very same genetic rhetoric to underscore its inevitability (and 
hence normality) in the existing population.  In both examples, the 
current state of our genetic knowledge provides the pretext for 
letting, respectively, the ease and the difficulty of strategic 
intervention carry more metaphysical weight than it might 
otherwise.  
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Yet there is an important difference between the relative ease with 
which a prima facie undesirable situation can be altered and the 
utility that would be ultimately served by altering it.  Temporal 
perspective typically makes the difference.  For example, even if we 
can now easily prevent certain physical disabilities, those 
disabilities may have historically served to expand our collective 
capacity to experience reality.  From the standpoint of philosophy, 
psychology, and linguistics, deafness and blindness are the obvious 
cases in point (Ree 1999).  Our quick assent to Singer’s call for 
eliminating “genetic defects” involves discounting the collective 
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gain that have been derived from nurturing them in the past and 
having forced “abled” people to extend their imagination and 
ingenuity to accommodate them (Lewontin 1993).  This is not to 
say that disabilities should be indefinitely perpetuated; rather it is 
to argue, on Singer’s own utilitarian grounds, for cultivating 
naturally occurring disabilities, at least until their distinct 
perspectives are absorbed into our common cultural inheritance.  
To be sure, this strategy needs to be tempered by the findings of 
genetic science, since certain fetal abnormalities may result in 
individuals whose suffering cannot be alleviated by any ambient 
social adjustments.4 
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To his credit, Singer realizes that little more than a metaphor 
connects Dawkins’ appeal to selfishness and the phenomena with 
which selfishness is normally associated (Singer 1999a, chap. 4).  
Nevertheless he allows Dawkins’ “gene’s eye-view” to anchor his 
discussion of the policy prospects for altruism.  The result is that 
Singer accords undue weight to selfishness at the level of human 
behavior and, more importantly, presumes that there is usually a 
tradeoff between self- and other-oriented action.  Thus, while 
Singer grants that some selfish behavior can be made to benefit 
others with the right incentives, his prescriptions tend toward 
veiled threats and explicit penalties, as in “pay higher taxes now or 
else expect more crime in the future.”  This suggests that he 
believes that promoting the cause of altruism is an uphill struggle 
against our selfish inclinations.  
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Instead, however, of simply importing a gene-based conception of 
the selfishness/altruism distinction to explain behavior, we might 
observe the implications of the distinction at the behavioral level 
itself.  A provocative frame of reference for this discussion is the 
“handicap principle,” which purports to explain altruism as a 
limited form of self-sacrifice that animals undergo to mark their 
status to members of their own species and sometimes of others 
(Zahavi and Zahavi 1997).  Without such altruism, it would be 
difficult for animals to orient themselves around their world, in 
both sociological and epistemological terms.  The handicap 
principle is meant to be quite general, covering mate selection, the 
mutual identification of predator and prey, not to mention basic 
representational practices.  
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The last sort of case is especially revealing, since the use of signs is 
normally explained in terms of economy of effort, as if the salient 
relation were between the word and the thing to which it refers.  
The point, then, would be that saying the word is usually more 
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economical than providing the thing.  However, according to the 
handicap principle, the evolutionarily salient relation transpires 
between the word and its utterer:  Why would someone feel 
compelled to say anything in the first place?  The answer to this 
question is not obviously economy of effort, since saying nothing at 
all would take less effort and the utterance often benefits the 
addressee more than the addresser.  Similarly one might ask:  Why 
do potential mates – or predator and prey, for that matter – 
announce their status (e. g., by engaging in song or displaying 
plumage) before enacting it.  
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To focus on the difference that the handicap principle makes, 
consider a representational practice as basic as my telling you 
something you did not know.  I am “handicapped” by spending 
time talking to you that I could have spent doing something of 
more direct benefit to me.  Moreover, by telling you what I know, I 
have eliminated any advantage I might have had over you by 
knowing it.  Yet these costs are offset by your recognition that I am 
a reliable source of information and hence someone to whom you 
should defer in the future.  In short, you come to depend on me 
because I took the initial risk of reaching out to you and it turned 
out to have mutually beneficial consequences, even if not in the 
same sense.  For, ultimately, altruists aim to display their 
superiority (“magnanimity”) to those who benefit from their 
actions.  This interpretation of altruism goes to the heart of the 
concept, as it was originally popularized in mid-19th century 
arguments for philanthropy.  It presupposes a world that is 
sufficiently rich in resources that individuals will be inclined 
toward risk-seeking behavior that aims to extend one's claims over 
others.  Here we begin to see a possible evolutionary basis for the 
quest for recognition.  Yet it is in marked contrast to the more 
Hobbesian world presumed in modern evolutionary accounts of 
behavior.  In that case, individuals are struggling to maintain what 
they already have, and hence are averse to taking risks unless a 
clear benefit can be foreseen.  Under the circumstances, 
selfishness is understandable.  
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It might be useful here to sketch the contrasting genealogies of the 
selfishness- and altruism-based accounts of evolution by arguing 
that after Hobbes' secularization of Adam’s fall, Darwin and his 
followers have sought non-theistic redemption in some chance 
combination of genetic dispositions and environmental 
expression.  In contrast, like Fukuyama’s account of the quest for 
recognition, the handicap principle begins from a position more 
akin to the Greco-Roman than the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
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namely, individuals regard themselves as gods in the making who 
demonstrate their admirability by their success at self-extension.  
Once the Illiad replaces Genesis as the creation myth, it becomes 
easy to see how the handicap principle may instill a spirit of 
“competitive altruism” as you and I try to outdo each other in 
displays of superiority.  The net effect is that we sacrifice more of 
ourselves, and in the process leave more traces of our 
accomplishments and failures, from which our successors may 
benefit.  
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The flamboyant gift-giving practices of the Kwakiutl of British 
Columbia that so fascinated Franz Boas and Marcel Mauss in the 
early 20th century – in which the natives would often risk their 
own welfare in the name of tribal recognition – obviously fall into 
this category (Boas 1921; Mauss 1954).  But so too would the 
development of elaborate information and communicative 
exchanges, be they conducted in the polis, on the playing field, in 
the pages of a scientific journal, or over the internet.  It would be 
difficult to reduce these instances of competitive altruism to latent 
self-interest because often the recipients benefit more in the long 
term than the benefactors.  In the larger biosphere, this holds 
especially across species, as potential predators and prey 
demonstrate their respective status to each other.  Yet the true 
prevalence of competitive altruism may be obscured by a stigmatic 
label like “obsessive-compulsive” behavior, which presumes that 
one should do more for one’s kith and kin than for a set of 
anonymous others whom one regularly encounters in rather 
specialized settings.  
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Moreover competitive altruism cannot be assimilated to the 
“reciprocal altruism” introduced by Robert Trivers, which tries to 
turn altruism into a form of extended self-interest whereby one 
gives to another expecting to receive something of comparable 
value in return (Trivers 1971).  In game-theoretic circles, this is 
known as the “tit-for-tat” strategy.  Peter Singer himself has 
probably done the most to turn this strategy into an ethical 
principle, but it remains a very limited basis on which to ground 
altruism, since it is anchored in the interest one has in others of 
one’s own kind (Singer 1981).  Singer then argues for extending the 
relevant sense of “kind,” mainly on the basis of biological and more 
broadly ecological considerations that cast doubt on the idea that 
human welfare can be addressed independently of animal welfare.  
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Charity or Contempt? 
A Unresolved Problem for 
Cross-Species Interpreters 
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As Robert Solomon has noted, Singer’s defense of altruism relies 
heavily – I would say much too heavily – on a Scottish 
Enlightenment conception of concern for others modeled on 
Newton’s inverse square law of gravitational attraction, so that by 
analogy concern diminishes as social distance from oneself 
increases (Solomon 1999; Singer 1999b).  This conception fails to 
acknowledge that once we start to acquire a scientifically nuanced 
understanding of our fellows, we might start to question their 
moral worth, which might in turn reverse the salience of the social 
distance principle.  
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Singer’s basic strategy for expanding what he calls “the circle of 
ethics”– his surrogate for altruism – is to show that certain 
physiological and genetic similarities between humans and non-
human animals compel us to include these non-humans in our 
calculations of welfare.  But for Singer, that then entails a re-
evaluation of human life, since the greater good of this expanded 
circle (and even its constitutent individuals) may be served by, say, 
allowing a healthy pig to live, while consigning a disabled human 
infant to death.  (The need for such tradeoffs clearly presupposes a 
policy regime with irremediably scarce resources, a point rarely 
made as explicit as it should be.) 
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Solomon criticizes Singer’s strategy for sacrificing compassion at 
the altar of reason.  He argues that, according to Singer’s logic, not 
only would the disabled infant be left to die, but so too the 
homeless person who refuses to find work.  If one knows with 
moral certainty that a given human will be of more cost than 
benefit to the expanded circle, then that person should be removed 
from the circle.  An apt analogy here may be to recall that Kepler 
had originally proposed the inverse square law to capture 
illumination as a function of distance from a light source.  Perhaps 
then, by increasing the power of the light source to enable the 
illumination of more distant objects (cf. healthy pigs), one may 
unintentionally consume less distant ones (cf. homeless humans) 
in flames.  
 
 
45 
 
I agree with Solomon that all this seems to follow from Singer’s 
argument.  But I disagree that it points to Singer’s 
uncompassionate hyper-rationalism.  Solomon would suggest that  
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the problem lies in the broadly utilitarian framework within which 
Singer operates.  On the contrary, I believe that Singer is not a 
hyper-rationalist but a hyper-empiricist, someone who lets his 
greater empirical knowledge of the differences in the behavioral 
patterns and motivational structures of human beings vis-a-vis 
those of non-human beings prejudice the value weightings he 
assigns in his utilitarian calculus.  In other words, one can know 
(or think one knows) too much about individuals to make an 
appropriate moral appraisal.  The benefit of the doubt is then 
accorded to those we know less about.  On that basis, I would say 
that Singer is biased against humans.  
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The legal system regularly counteracts the perils of hyper-
empiricism in the circumscribed procedure of courtroom trials:  
who can be a juror in a case, what counts as permissible testimony, 
etc.  John Rawls (1971) famously conferred philosophical 
respectability on this practice by arguing that decisions concerning 
the most fundamental principles of justice require a “veil of 
ignorance” in which the decision-maker knows only the most 
general features of her society but not her particular status 
therein.  
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Nowadays political theorists tend to regard Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance as little more than an intriguing artifice propping up a 
theory of justice that merits our endorsement on other grounds.  
However, I believe that the veil reflects the deep need for a stopgap 
against any undue influence that the varying degrees of knowledge 
we have of our fellow humans and non-humans may have on our 
normative judgments.  Although Rawls himself justified the veil of 
ignorance on transcendental grounds, I would do so on what I 
have called “reflexive naturalist” grounds (Fuller 1993; cf. Fuller 
1985, where I first explored the epistemological import of the veil 
of ignorance).  In other words, among the empirical components of 
our normative judgments should be the “meta-fact” that the 
historical development of human knowledge has been uneven, 
both in terms of what is known and who knows it.  Contrary to 
Rawls’ own construal of the veil of ignorance, failure to recognize 
this point is not limited to letting greater knowledge of our own 
situation disadvantage others socially distant from us.  At a more 
general level, it provides ironic vindication of La Rochefoucauld’s 
maxim, “Familiarity breeds contempt.”  Specifically our greater 
familiarity with humans vis-a-vis animals breeds contemptuous 
interpretations of our fellow humans.  (On the rationality of this 
and related psychological mechanisms, see Elster 1999. ) 
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That familiarity might breed contempt goes unnoticed because the 
sociobiological literature on which Singer relies often presumes 
that our knowledge of non-humans is in some normatively 
relevant way better than that of humans, since humans are 
presumed to engage in more complex behaviors than other 
animals, given the supposedly more complicated ways in which 
our genetic potential interacts with the environment.  Of course, 
read rhetorically, sociobiological accounts of non-humans are full 
of covert, unconscious, and otherwise unacknowledged borrowings 
from Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Freud.  The problem is getting 
sociobiologists to see Marx et al.  as relevant to the human beings 
for which their theories were originally designed!  A charitable 
understanding of this topsy-turvy situation is that social scientific 
theories like those of Marx typically identify only a few variables as 
salient for explaining human behavior.  Sociobiologists find this 
too simple, unless these variables can be located in morally 
“simpler” organisms that then provide evolutionary precedents for 
human behavior.  Ants thus replace Althusser as the bearers of 
epistemic authority.  
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However, once we lay to rest the chimera that we know more about 
non-humans than humans, is there any way of justifying the La 
Rochefoucauldian interpretive principle?  I would say yes, but it 
requires that we transcend the perspectives of both humans and 
animals, and instead adopt the standpoint of God – but in the 
specific Enlightenment sense that made deus absconditus such an 
attractive image for Voltaire and his fellow deists.  For them, “the 
best of all possible worlds” implied that humanity was created in 
the image and likeness of God, including the freedom allowed to 
God.  However, it was a deliberately imperfect reproduction 
designed to challenge humans to use their freedom to earn their 
salvation.  In contrast, animals were created in a perfectly amoral 
state.  Whereas animals are always all they can be, humans can 
always be more than they are.  On this basis, familiarity with 
humanity’s potential may breed contempt for what particular 
individuals make of it.  
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The model for this attitude is traceable to La Rochefoucauld’s own 
origins as a mid-17th century French aristocrat who was more than 
adequately familiar with how members of his own class 
squandered their privilege, ultimately ceding it to the absolute 
monarchy of Louis XIV.  Thus he looked more charitably upon 
those who improved upon, rather than degraded, their 
inheritance.  What distinguishes Singer’s interpretive stance from 
La Rochefoucauld’s is the former's failure to take seriously what 
 
Steve Fuller 84 Poroi, 1, 1, January, 2001 
can be added through will and effort to one's genetic endowment.  
In this sense, Singer remains deaf to the quest for recognition, at 
least in the human species and probably others as well.  
 
 
 
© Steve Fuller, 2001.  
 
 
 
 Notes  
 
 
 
1     This essay has been greatly improved by David Depew’s deft 
editorial hand.  I would also like to thank Greg Ransom of 
Mariposa College, California, for allowing my recent book, The 
Governance of Science (Milton Keynes, UK, Open University 
Press, 2000), to be debated in the Hayek electronic listserv in late 
July and early August 2000, during which many of the views 
expressed here were consolidated. 
 
 
 
 
2     My thanks to David Depew for reminding me of this point. 
 
 
 
 
3     I am indebted to Stephen Toulmin’s most recent work for this 
insight.  
 
 
 
4     My thanks to David Depew for raising this very valid point. 
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